

## Legislative Intervention in Executive Social Programs: A Case Study of DPR Influence in the Distribution of the *Program Indonesia Pintar (PIP)*

**Marva Sadira Suksmoputri**  
Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia  
Email: [marvasadirasuksmo.p@gmail.com](mailto:marvasadirasuksmo.p@gmail.com)

---

**Keywords:**

Executive-Legislative Relations;  
Legislative Intervention;  
*Program Indonesia Pintar (PIP)*; Patronage Politics.

---

**Abstract**

Study examines the dynamics of executive–legislative relations in Indonesia by analyzing the informal interventions of members of the House of Representatives (*DPR*) in the distribution of the *Program Indonesia Pintar (PIP)*, a social assistance scheme formally administered by the executive. Although the legal framework assigns program implementation to the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and local education offices, field practices show that legislators frequently position themselves as intermediaries or even gatekeepers in the allocation of *PIP* benefits. Drawing on policy documents, secondary data, and reported cases, this study argues that such legislative involvement constitutes an encroachment on executive functions, blurring institutional boundaries and weakening bureaucratic accountability, which directly impacts program integrity and governance. The paper situates these practices within theories of delegation, patronage politics, and informal institutions, demonstrating how political actors leverage social programs for constituency service and electoral advantage. Ultimately, the study highlights how the interaction between formal rules and informal political behavior affects the integrity, equity, and transparency of welfare program delivery in Indonesia.

---

### INTRODUCTION

Education plays a central role in shaping human capital and promoting long-term socioeconomic development in Indonesia (Sofiani et al., 2025). As a country with significant economic inequality and regional disparities, ensuring equal access to education has long been a government priority (Karolina, 2021). For many families, especially those belonging to low-income or vulnerable socioeconomic groups, financial barriers continue to pose substantial challenges to children's ability to complete basic education. In response, the government has created several scholarship and education assistance programs aimed at removing economic obstacles and supporting students from disadvantaged backgrounds. These initiatives are tailored to address regional disparities by allocating resources based on local needs, thereby improving school enrolment and retention rates while promoting equitable access to quality education across Indonesia's diverse regions (Mashur, 2023).

The most prominent of these initiatives is the *Program Indonesia Pintar (PIP)*, which serves as the flagship national education assistance program for school-aged children from low-income households. *PIP* provides direct financial support through cash transfers to eligible students at the elementary, junior high, and senior high school levels, including vocational schools. The program aims to ensure that economic hardship does not prevent children from attending school, purchasing learning materials, or participating fully in their education

(Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia, 2025). The assistance is channeled through the *Kartu Indonesia Pintar (KIP)*, which serves as a mechanism for delivering funds directly into beneficiaries' bank accounts. The government regularly monitors and evaluates *PIP*'s effectiveness through data collection and impact assessments, ensuring funds reach intended beneficiaries and contribute to increased enrolment and retention rates (Center for Education Financing Services, 2023).

Two ministries within the executive branch formally administer *PIP*: the Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology (*Kemendikbudristek*) for general education and the Ministry of Religious Affairs (*Kemenag*) for students in Islamic schools or madrasahs. These ministries determine program guidelines, coordinate data collection, manage beneficiary lists, and ensure effective disbursement of funds. The program relies heavily on the *Data Terpadu Kesejahteraan Sosial (DTKS)*, Indonesia's unified social welfare database, to identify eligible students (Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology, n.d.). Students may also qualify if their households hold a *Kartu Keluarga Sejahtera (KKS)*. Schools play a key role in submitting student lists to local education offices, while partner banks such as *BRI* and *BNI* handle the direct fund transfers. This mechanism is specifically designed to minimize intermediaries, prevent political interference, and ensure that assistance reaches beneficiaries efficiently and transparently, thereby reinforcing the program's commitment to transparency and accountability for stakeholders (Azis, 2023).

Before *PIP* was introduced, the *Bantuan Siswa Miskin (BSM)* program served a similar purpose in providing financial assistance to low-income students. Although *BSM* has since been integrated into *PIP*, its legacy persists in public discourse, with some communities still referring to educational aid programs as *BSM*. *PIP*, however, represents a more structured, data-driven, and cross-ministerial approach intended to reach a broader population and distribute funds more equitably, reflecting ongoing progress and increased reliability (Rosita, 2023).

Overall, Indonesia's education assistance programs reflect a strong formal commitment to Equity and social welfare. These initiatives are grounded in the principle that all children, regardless of socioeconomic status or regional origin, deserve equal opportunities to pursue education. The policy framework emphasizes direct disbursement, transparent administration, and eligibility based on socioeconomic data. Emphasizing transparency helps build trust in the program's integrity, reassuring policymakers and researchers of its commitment to fairness (Center for Education Financing Services, 2025a). Through these mechanisms, the central government seeks to minimize political influence, ensure efficiency, and reduce implementation distortions.

In practice, the implementation of *PIP* often diverges significantly from its formal regulatory framework, revealing a clear gap between administrative design and political reality. Although the legal and administrative rules firmly place the authority for *PIP* distribution within the executive branch, the involvement of members of the House of Representatives (*DPR*) has become increasingly visible in several regions (Umar, 2025). Legislators sometimes position themselves as intermediaries who can assist students in obtaining *PIP* benefits or as key actors responsible for facilitating access to educational assistance. In more assertive forms of involvement, some *DPR* members even organize social events, independently collect student data, or inform communities that they personally secured the funding. Such practices blur the boundaries between the legislative and executive functions and introduce informal political

dynamics into a program intended to be technocratic and administratively driven. Emphasizing transparency in these issues can help the audience trust the analysis and understand the importance of addressing informal practices (Achmad, 2024).

This divergence between rules and practice creates a structural conflict. Formally, *PIP* is designed as a technocratic program managed by executive institutions, relying on DTKS data and direct bank transfers to minimize intermediaries and promote transparency. The clarity of this institutional design underscores the importance of maintaining strict boundaries between branches of government to ensure good governance and accountability (Sugiman, 2020). However, informally, certain legislators portray themselves as gatekeepers or facilitators, implying that students' access to *PIP* depends on their political intervention. This informal political framing not only contradicts the program's legal architecture but also risks undermining public trust in its neutrality and integrity. Highlighting these dynamics can help the audience understand the critical role of governance in maintaining public confidence in social programs (Umar, 2025).

The consequences of this divergence are significant. It can undermine bureaucratic accountability, distort targeting mechanisms, and reduce transparency in the program's implementation. Informal legislative involvement also risks politicizing public resources and creating inequitable distribution patterns, especially if beneficiaries believe that access to *PIP* depends on political affiliation or support. This politicization can weaken the integrity of the program and erode public trust, demonstrating how social assistance programs, even when designed to be apolitical, can become embedded in the broader dynamics of political contestation (Umar, 2025).

The tension between formal institutional mandates and informal political practices underscores the divergence between policy design and political realities, making the distribution of *PIP* a crucial case study for examining Indonesia's governance challenges. It highlights how welfare programs can become subject to political claims and informal interventions, revealing the complex interaction among administrative rules, political incentives, and public perceptions.

The gap in existing literature is threefold. First, most studies on *PIP* have adopted a policy implementation perspective without adequately examining the political economy of distribution. Second, research on executive-legislative relations in Indonesia has largely focused on budgeting and lawmaking functions, neglecting the micro-politics of social program implementation. Third, while patronage politics has been extensively studied in the context of electoral competition, its manifestation in the administration of non-discretionary, rights-based social assistance programs remains underexplored. This paper addresses these gaps by analyzing how *DPR* members' informal interventions in *PIP* distribution affect program integrity, bureaucratic accountability, and public trust, thereby contributing to the literature on governance and political economy of social policy in Indonesia.

Study examines the relationship between formal legal norms and informal political practices in the governance of education assistance programs in Indonesia, highlighting their importance for informed legal analysis. Using the *Program Indonesia Pintar (PIP)* as the focal point, this research aims to evaluate how legislative involvement should be regulated and how institutional frameworks should operate in accordance with constitutional principles and statutory mandates. Guided by a normative legal approach, the research addresses the following

questions: 1) Does the involvement of *DPR* members in proposing and promoting the *Program Indonesia Pintar (PIP)*, which creates public perceptions that they distribute the assistance, constitute a deviation from the legal rules governing *PIP*'s administrative mechanism and the statutory limits of legislative authority? 2) What are the legal and administrative implications of *DPR* involvement in the implementation of *PIP*, with particular reference to equity, accountability, and adherence to statutory procedures?

The primary objective of study is to conduct an in-depth analysis of the nature, underlying motives, and broader institutional consequences of legislative intervention in an education assistance program that is formally administered by the executive branch, with particular emphasis on informal legislative practices, using the *Program Indonesia Pintar (PIP)* as a central case. Study aims to unpack the various forms of informal involvement undertaken by members of the House of Representatives (*DPR*) in the distribution of *PIP* funds and to assess how these practices intersect with, and potentially undermine, the formal administrative procedures established by executive institutions. By examining how legislators position themselves within a program that falls under executive authority, the paper seeks to illuminate the implications of such intervention for the functioning of Indonesia's executive–legislative relations, the integrity and autonomy of the bureaucracy, and the overall governance of social welfare programs. Furthermore, study explores how these informal practices affect principles of political accountability, the separation of powers, and the neutrality of public service delivery, thereby contributing to a deeper understanding of how political dynamics shape policy implementation in practice.

## **METHOD**

Study employed a normative legal research approach, focusing on the examination of legal norms governing education assistance programs in Indonesia, specifically the *Program Indonesia Pintar (PIP)*. The methodology aims to assess whether the participation of *DPR* members constitutes a departure from the statutory requirements and constitutional principles that define the powers of the executive and legislative branches.

## **RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS**

The administration of the *Program Indonesia Pintar (PIP)* is governed by a complex hierarchy of laws and regulations that clearly place responsibility for its implementation within the executive branch. Constitutionally, the mandate to provide education and social assistance is addressed to the government under Articles 31 and 34 of the 1945 Constitution, which direct the state to develop and operate education and welfare systems. Article 31 of the 1945 Constitution states that “every citizen has the right to education and is obliged to complete basic education, while the government is responsible for financing and organizing a national education system, supported by a dedicated share of the national and regional budgets” (Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945, Pasal 31). Article 34 provides that “the state must care for poor and neglected children, develop a social security system for all citizens, and ensure adequate public services, thereby establishing a constitutional basis for education-linked social assistance, such as *PIP*, as part of the government's welfare responsibilities” (Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945, Pasal 34).

These provisions, when read together, do not assign any implementing authority to the House of Representatives (*DPR*). The *DPR's* constitutional role is confined to legislation, budgeting, and oversight, as set out in Article 20A of the Constitution (Sujana, 2024). This structural division implies that the execution of educational assistance programs, including *PIP*, is constitutionally reserved for the executive ministries. Laws such as the National Education System Law (Law 20/2003) authorize the government's executive agencies to administer educational funding and assistance programs, while the State Finance Law (Law 17/2003) vests discretion over the execution of *APBN*-funded initiatives exclusively in the executive, leaving *DPR* with the authority to debate and approve the budget but not to execute or distribute its components (Law Number 20 of 2003; Law Number 17 of 2003). The more operational aspects of *PIP* are regulated through presidential regulations, ministerial regulations, and technical guidelines issued by *Kemendikbudristek* and *Kemenag*. These rules establish a clearly defined administrative mechanism: eligibility is determined through the national social welfare database (DTKS) and additional school submissions. ministerial decrees formally designate recipients, and funds are disbursed directly by partner banks to students' accounts. Notably, at no point in these regulations is the *DPR* assigned any role in proposing recipients, collecting data, verifying eligibility, facilitating distribution, or conducting any activity associated with implementation (Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology, 2020).

Under the principle of *atribusi kewenangan* embodied in Indonesian administrative law, public authority must originate directly from statutory authorization. Since no provision grants legislators a role in *PIP* administration, any attempt by *DPR* members to participate in data collection, recommendations, socialization, or symbolic distribution constitutes action undertaken without legal basis (Susanto, 2020). The Administrative Government Law (Law 30/2014) strictly defines administrative actions as those undertaken by government officials endowed with executive authority (Law Number 30 of 2014). A legislator, by definition, is not an administrative authority and therefore lacks the legal capacity to carry out administrative decision-making or program execution. When *DPR* members act as though they have authority to influence administrative processes, such as by compiling lists of potential beneficiaries or presenting themselves as intermediaries to access *PIP*, they are performing executive functions they do not possess. Under Law 30/2014, such actions are classified as unauthorized action and carry the consequences of invalidity, as administrative actions must be performed only by officials legally empowered to carry them out. An administrative decision influenced by unauthorized intervention may therefore be considered procedurally defective and subject to annulment (Kurniawan, 2020).

From the perspective of legislative authority, *DPR's* involvement in *PIP* similarly exceeds statutory limits. The revised Law on the Structure and Authority of the People's Consultative Assembly, *DPR*, *DPD*, and *DPRD* (UU MD3) operationalizes the Constitution's delineation of legislative powers (Kurniawan, 2020). *DPR* members are expressly restricted to legislative, budgeting, and oversight functions; which they have no authority to execute, manage, or distribute government programs. Even in exercising oversight, *DPR* is limited to requesting information, conducting hearings, and summoning officials; it may not intervene directly in implementation (Isra, 2013). Thus, when legislators present themselves as facilitators of *PIP* or suggest that they influence the disbursement of educational assistance, they exceed the statutory boundaries of their office. Such conduct undermines the clarity of the separation of functions

between the legislative and executive branches, a principle rooted in the Constitution and statutes. This ambiguity undermines the legal certainty (*kepastian hukum*) that administrative and constitutional law requires, because it creates an impression of mixed or shared authority which is vital to their confidence in constitutional law (Sunarto, 2016).

The executive's exclusive authority over *APBN* execution, established by Law 17/2003, further emphasizes the illegality of legislative involvement. Once *DPR* approves the *APBN*, its implementation becomes the sole domain of the president and the ministries. Legislators cannot imply that they control or distribute *APBN*-funded benefits. When *DPR* members publicly claim involvement in delivering *PIP* funds, organizing distribution ceremonies, or communicating to communities that *PIP* assistance is available through them, they are misrepresenting the legal authority over budget execution (Tjandra, 2013). This misrepresentation is not merely a political issue; it is a legal deviation from the budgeting framework, which demands strict adherence to the principle that execution belongs entirely to the executive branch. Such conduct risks eroding the integrity of budgetary governance and may distort public understanding of governmental authority.

Furthermore, the involvement of *DPR* members in proposing or promoting *PIP* beneficiaries constitutes an apparent deviation from the procedures established in *PIP*'s implementing regulations. The program's technical guidelines require that data on potential recipients originate from schools, local education offices, and the *DTKS* system, all of which operate within the executive administrative hierarchy (Center for Education Financing Services, 2025b). Data submitted by legislators falls outside this chain and thus violates the procedural integrity of the program. Which under Indonesian administrative law, procedural deviation, especially when caused by unauthorized actors, undermines the legitimacy of administrative decisions. If unauthorized external actors shape beneficiary data or eligibility determinations, the legal basis of those decisions becomes questionable (Kurniawan, 2020). Such involvement risks introducing inequality and non-compliance with formal eligibility criteria, thereby undermining the regulatory framework's purpose: ensuring transparency, objectivity, and fairness.

This involvement may also be categorized too as maladministration under the legal concept recognized in administrative and Ombudsman practices. Maladministration encompasses abuse of authority, unlawful interference, procedural deviation, and obstruction of administrative processes (Law Number 37 of 2008). Legislators who intervene in program implementation, despite lacking the authority to do so, engage in abuse of authority and unauthorized interference. These are legal classifications that apply regardless of whether there is corrupt intent. Even well-intentioned interventions, if carried out without legal authority, constitute maladministration because they disrupt the orderly functioning of administrative processes and create the appearance of political dependence in accessing government benefits (Susanto, 2020).

Several *DPR* members have defended their involvement in implementing the *PIP* by framing their actions as legitimate aspects of their representative responsibilities. Many legislators assert that assisting constituents in accessing the *PIP* aligns with their primary function of gathering and addressing public aspirations, noting that communities frequently approach them directly for support. Others contend that bureaucratic procedures are complex and that citizens in remote or underserved regions often lack understanding of the

administrative requirements for obtaining *PIP* benefits, prompting legislators to facilitate communication with relevant ministries. For example, Juliyatmono from Commission X has publicly described this involvement as part of the “aspiration channel,” implying that *DPR* members play a role in ensuring educational assistance reaches those in need (Sekretariat Jenderal DPR RI, 2025). Similarly, Lalu Hadrian Irfani has justified his participation by emphasizing the need to accelerate and socialize efforts to expedite students’ receipt of entitlements (Gontb.com, 2025). In various media interviews, legislators further argue that their activities constitute outreach or public education, rather than interference, and are intended to prevent fund deductions or mismanagement by local actors (Antara, 2025). Despite these justifications, such actions remain controversial because they blur the distinction between political representation and administrative authority, raising concerns about whether they constitute legitimate advocacy or unlawful encroachment on executive functions.

Several documented cases highlight the tangible effects of informal interventions on the integrity and equity of *PIP* distribution. Reports from Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) describe instances where legislators in Polewali Mandar (Polman) directly submitted lists of proposed *PIP* recipients to local schools. School administrators often regarded these submissions as politically influential, despite lacking legal authority. This practice led to unequal access, as students outside the legislators’ networks encountered greater obstacles to inclusion on beneficiary lists (Indonesia Corruption Watch, 2024). In another widely reported case, Rajiv, a member of the West Java Regional House of Representatives (*DPRD*), publicly announced the distribution of 10,000 *PIP* scholarships in Bandung. This action reinforced public perceptions that *PIP* allocations were based on political patronage rather than on administrative procedure. Media reports further indicate that some schools felt compelled to submit student data to legislative staff, fearing that non-cooperation would disadvantage their students (Detikcom, 2025). These dynamics have produced inconsistencies in distribution, including cases where students not listed in the DTKS database received *PIP* funding due to political recommendations, while eligible students were excluded (Achmad, 2024). Collectively, these examples demonstrate that informal legislative involvement can compromise targeting accuracy, foster perceptions of favoritism, and undermine standardized administrative processes intended to ensure fairness and transparency in the distribution of educational assistance.

Considering these legal principles collectively, the involvement of *DPR* members in proposing or promoting *PIP* and creating the perception that they distribute the assistance clearly constitutes a deviation from the legal rules governing the program's administrative mechanism. It exceeds the statutory limits of legislative authority. Constitutionally, the *DPR* is prohibited from participating in program execution; statutorily, it is confined to oversight rather than implementation; administratively, it has no authority to make or influence decisions related to beneficiary determination or fund distribution; and procedurally, it is excluded from every step of the *PIP* administrative chain (Sujana, 2024; Isra, 2013; Sugiman, 2020). Therefore, from a purely doctrinal legal standpoint grounded in constitutional law, administrative law, statutory interpretation, and regulatory compliance, *DPR* involvement of the kind described is unlawful and constitutes an apparent deviation from the formal legal order that governs *PIP*.

## CONCLUSION

Study demonstrates that the involvement of members of the House of Representatives (*DPR*) in the implementation of the *Program Indonesia Pintar (PIP)* constitutes a clear deviation from Indonesia's constitutional and administrative law framework. The Constitution assigns the execution of government programs exclusively to the executive branch, while the *DPR* is limited to its legislative, budgetary, and oversight functions. The statutory and regulatory framework of *PIP* further reinforces this separation by granting full administrative authority to the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Religious Affairs, supported by DTKS-based eligibility and direct bank transfers designed to eliminate discretionary intermediaries. When *DPR* members propose beneficiary names, collect student data, or participate in symbolic handover events, they act without legal authority, undermine the principle of *atribusi kewenangan*, and violate the procedural structure established to ensure program integrity. These practices also create administrative risks, including unequal access, *favouritism*, and the misperception that political affiliation is necessary to receive educational assistance. Documented cases across various regions illustrate how such interference has produced inconsistencies, pressured school administrators, distorted targeting accuracy, and fostered public distrust in *PIP*'s neutrality. Despite these legal and administrative violations, legislators frequently justify their involvement by claiming to perform constituency service, facilitate public access to information, or accelerate aid distribution. However, such arguments cannot override the fundamental limits of legislative authority. Informal political practices cannot substitute for formal administrative mechanisms, and representative functions cannot legally expand into executive execution. The program's design intentionally minimizes opportunities for political brokerage, and *DPR* involvement reintroduces precisely the risks that the regulatory framework seeks to prevent. Given these findings, the appropriate policy response is not to remove *DPR* entirely from the education assistance ecosystem, but to clarify and strengthen its role so that it remains within constitutional boundaries. *DPR* members must be prohibited from performing any actions that resemble program execution, including proposing beneficiaries, collecting data, or distributing *PIP*

## REFERENCE

- Achmad, R. W. (2024). Politics and social welfare: Dynamics of social assistance programs on electability in Indonesia. *Jurnal Wacana Politik*, 9(2), 205–215.
- Antara. (2025, August 8). Komisi X *DPR* RI minta tak ada pemotongan dana *PIP* di NTB. Antara News. <https://mataram.antaranews.com/berita/477721/komisi-x-DPR-ri-minta-tak-ada-pemotongan-dana-beasiswa-PIP-di-ntb>
- Azis, A. (2023). Analisis penerapan *Program Indonesia Pintar (PIP)* perspektif good governance. *Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan*, 5(1), 1–10.
- Center for Education Financing Services. (2023, January 8). Begini alur pencatatan di DTKS agar dapat bantuan *PIP*. Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology. <https://puslapdik.kemendikdasmen.go.id/begini-alur-pencatatan-di-dtks-agar-dapat-bantuan-PIP/>
- Center for Education Financing Services. (2025, April 22). Mekanisme penarikan dana *PIP (Program Indonesia Pintar)*. Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology.

- <https://pusatinformasi.ult.kemendikdasmen.go.id/hc/id/articles/40657004419225-Mekanisme-Penarikan-Dana-PIP-Program-Indonesia-Pintar>
- Center for Education Financing Services. (2025, June 1). Tanya jawab tentang *Program Indonesia Pintar* (1). Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology. [https://puslapdik.kemendikdasmen.go.id/tanya-jawab-tentang-program-indonesia-pintar- 1/Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia of 1945](https://puslapdik.kemendikdasmen.go.id/tanya-jawab-tentang-program-indonesia-pintar-1/Constitution%20of%20the%20Republic%20of%20Indonesia%20of%201945).
- Detikcom. (2025, July 3). Legislatur Rajiv salurkan 10.000 bantuan *PIP* ke warga Kabupaten Bandung. DetikNews. [https://news.detik.com/berita/d-8031338/legislatur-rajiv-salurkan-10-000-bantuan-PIP-ke- warga-kabupaten-bandung](https://news.detik.com/berita/d-8031338/legislatur-rajiv-salurkan-10-000-bantuan-PIP-ke-warga-kabupaten-bandung)
- Gontb.com. (2025, April 14). Wakil Ketua Komisi X *DPR* RI Lalu Hadrian Irfani sosialisasikan Program *PIP* di Lombok Barat. [https://gontb.com/2025/04/14/wakil-ketua-komisi-x-DPR- ri-h-lalu-hadrian-irfani-sosialisasi-program-indonesia-pintar/](https://gontb.com/2025/04/14/wakil-ketua-komisi-x-dpr-ri-h-lalu-hadrian-irfani-sosialisasi-program-indonesia-pintar/)
- Indonesia Corruption Watch. (2024, October 27). ICW ungkap peran *DPR* dalam penyelewengan beasiswa *PIP* di Polman. Aktual.com. <https://aktual.com/icw-ungkap-peran-DPR-dalam-penyelewengan-beasiswa-PIP-di-polman/>
- Isra, S. (2013). Pergeseran fungsi legislasi: Menguatnya model legislasi parlementer dalam sistem presidensial Indonesia. *Rajawali Pers*.
- Karolina, V. (2021). Equality and equity in Indonesian education. *Indonesian Journal of Contemporary Studies*, 1(1), 1–12.
- Kurniawan, T. (2020). Penjelasan hukum (restatement) konsep tindakan administrasi pemerintahan menurut Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2014. *Jurnal Hukum dan Peradilan*, 9(1), 64–85.
- Law Number 17 of 2003 on State Finance.
- Law Number 17 of 2014 on the MPR, *DPR*, DPD, and *DPRD*. Law Number 20 of 2003 on the National Education System.
- Law Number 30 of 2014 on Government Administration.
- Law Number 37 of 2008 on the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia.
- Mashur, M. (2023). Improving access to higher education for low-income high achievers through scholarship programs in Indonesia. *Nusantara Education Review*, 3(1), 45–60.
- Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology. (2020). Regulation of the Minister of Education and Culture Number 10 of 2020 on the Indonesia Smart Program.
- Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology. (2022). Regulation of the Secretary General Number 10 of 2022 on the Implementation of the Indonesia Smart Program for Higher Education.
- Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology. (n.d.). *Program Indonesia Pintar*. <https://www.kemendikbudristek.com/indonesiapintar-sub/>
- Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia. (2025, April 30). *Program Indonesia Pintar (PIP): Pemerataan akses pendidikan untuk semua anak bangsa*. Media Keuangan. <https://mediakeuangan.kemenkeu.go.id/article/show/program-indonesia-pintar-PIP-pemerataan-akses-pendidikan-untuk-semua-anak-bangsa>
- Rosita, H. (2023). Evaluasi *Program Indonesia Pintar* dalam pemerataan akses pendidikan. *Epistemik: Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Pendidikan*, 4(2), 1–15.

- Sekretariat Jenderal DPR RI. (2025, October 16). Juliyatmono tegaskan *PIP* harus senantiasa terealisasi di Dapil Jateng IV. <https://www.DPR.go.id/kegiatan-DPR/berita/Juliyatmono-Tegaskan-PIP-Harus-Senantiasa-Terealisasi-di-Dapil-Jateng-IV-60234>
- Sofiani, I. Y., Surur, M., Khotimah, M. H., Sugianto, S., & Fali, I. M. (2025). The Urgency of Education in Supporting the Country's Eco-nomic Development Through the Human Capital Theory Approach. *International Journal of Islamic Educational Research*, 2(4), 61–70.
- Sugiman, S. (2020). Fungsi legislasi DPR pasca amandemen UUD NKRI 1945. *Jurnal Ilmu Hukum Dirgantara*, 10(2), 45–58.
- Sujana, I. G. (2024). Kedudukan dan fungsi Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat pasca amandemen UUD 1945. *Indonesian Journal of Law and Social Review*, 3(1), 1–15.
- Sunarto. (2016). Fungsi legislasi DPR pasca amandemen UUD 1945. *Integralistik*, 28(1), 15–27.
- Susanto, S. N. (2020). Metode perolehan dan batas-batas wewenang pemerintahan. *Jurnal Administrative Law and Governance*, 3(1), 1–18.
- Tjandra, W. R. (2013). Hukum administrasi negara. In *Kompilasi pemikiran tentang dinamika hukum dalam masyarakat* (pp. 1–25). Sinar Grafika.
- Umar, M. M. (2025). Social assistance policy in Indonesia: Corruption, politicization, and governance challenges. *Dialektika: Jurnal Ilmu Sosial*, 14(2), 145–170.